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Abstract
This paper investigates how tariﬀ liberalization has aﬀected exporting at the product-
destination level in emerging countries. We use a highly disaggregated (6 digit level of the
harmonized system  HS  classiﬁcation) bilateral measure of market access to compare tariﬀs
applied in 1996 and 2006, which includes the timing of the Uruguay Round and episodes of
bilateral liberalization. Our econometric estimations consider impacts of tariﬀ cuts on three
components of the trade margins: extensive margin of entry (new trade relationships at the
product-destination level), extensive margin of exit (disappearance of existing relationships)
and intensive margin of trade (deepening existing relationships). Our main estimates indicate
that a reduction of bilateral applied tariﬀs of 1 percentage point increases the extensive margin
of entry by 0.1% and the intensive one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit
by 0.25%.
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1 Introduction1
This paper provides an ex post assessment of how emerging economies' exports have been aﬀected
by the reduction in tariﬀs associated with the most recent episode of large scale trade liberalization
and continuous expansion of bilateral agreements.2
The last successful round of multilateral negotiations  the Uruguay Round  was concluded
in Marrakech in April 1994 and implemented in the ten years 1995-2005, i.e. in a period when
several developing countries emerged. Tariﬀs on industrial goods were reduced by 40%3 and the
two sectors consigned to the fringes of the multilateral system  agriculture and textile and clothing
 were reintegrated within the normal discipline of the multilateral trade system. The conclusions
of the agreement were enforced for tariﬀs on goods for a ﬁve year period starting January 1, 1995.
For agriculture, the implementation period for the country-speciﬁc commitments was six years for
developed countries. In accordance with the Special and Diﬀerential Treatment principle, developing
countries were allowed up to 10 years for implementation of their commitments.
Thus, the Uruguay Round  and more generally the related period of intense tariﬀ dismantling
including bilateral trade agreements  provides a good case to study comprehensive reductions
in tariﬀs at world level. It is especially interesting since during the period of implementation of
the agreement, the rapid emergence of new players on world markets profoundly reshaped trade
patterns.
Beyond tariﬀs, additional trade policy changes took place in the ten-year period under observa-
tion. The signatory countries established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and concluded an
ambitious agreement covering numerous issues including non-tariﬀ measures, anti-dumping, sub-
sidies, intellectual property, trade related investment measures, dispute settlement mechanisms, a
reduction in tariﬀ escalation4 and the termination on January 1, 2005 of the transitional Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).5 Against this background our focus is the impact of tariﬀ disman-
tling on emerging countries exports and to estimate its impact on the magniﬁcation of existing
1We are grateful to two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. We are deeply indebted to
Xavier Pichot for his help in constructing our raw dataset of tariﬀs. We thank the two referees and participants
at ETSG 2011, FREIT-EITI 2013, RIEF 2013, CEPII seminar and Geneva Trade and Development Workshop for
helpful comments. Part of this research was funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), under grant
ANR-12-JSH1-0002-01.
2A large body of literature examines ex ante what might be the outcome of the Round (e.g. Harrison et al. (1997)
based on a sectoral CGE approach and focusing on overall welfare gains. Here we adopt an ex post approach which
does not limit our investigation to the eﬀects of the Round per se but includes the impact of the tariﬀ cuts more
generally - whether multilateral, bilateral or even unilateral.
3More precisely, 40% for developed countries, 37% developing countries and 25% least developed countries.
4Tariﬀ escalation occurs when tariﬀs increase with the value added in the ﬁnal product, e.g. tariﬀs are higher on
canned fruits than on fresh fruits.
5The ATC substituted for the bilateral quotas negotiated under the Multiﬁber Arrangement (1974-94).
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trade ﬂows and the creation of new ﬂows.
To what extent tariﬀ dismantling contributed to the emergence of new super traders such as
China, and to a surge in exports from emerging countries more generally, remains an open ques-
tion. Apart from these trade policy changes, other determinants may have played a role, including
the economic growth of importing and exporting countries, the upward shift in the comparative
advantage of exporting countries associated with their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
growth, the drastic reductions in transport costs due to containerization, the increase in foreign
direct investments, and the development of global value chains and technological capabilities (Yi,
2003; Hanson, 2012). The emergence of new trade ﬂows may also be driven by political factors and
a reduction in the country risk.
If we focus only on the actions taken by the WTO, other dimensions such as the set of rules
providing multilateral trade discipline and the accession of new members may have played a role.6
Similarly if we focus on tariﬀs, not everything relies in tariﬀ cuts. By binding their tariﬀs, WTO
members oﬀer market access security to potential export partners, which aﬀects individual ﬁrms'
market entry decisions.7 This reduced uncertainty is expected to have a positive impact on the
extensive margin of trade (Francois and Martin, 2004). Sala et al. (2010) ﬁnd clear theoretical
evidence of this mechanism in a heterogeneous ﬁrm framework, and present a numerical simulation
of how market access responds to cuts in bound rates even in presence of a binding overhang.
In the case of emerging countries, we examine the extent to which cuts in the applied tariﬀs faced
on exporting markets led to zero trade ﬂows turning positive (the extensive margin of entry) or
reduce the probability of ﬂows' disappearance (the extensive margin of exit), and the impact on the
value of existing export ﬂows (the intensive margin). These margin deﬁnitions are similar to those
usually applied in the trade literature (see e.g. (Besede² and Prusa, 2011)).8 Our sample includes
18 emerging exporting countries and 25 importing partners. The period 1995-2005 corresponds to
full implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement. However, our analysis starts in 1996 because
6Rose (2004) argues that WTO membership has no eﬀect on trade but takes no account of the shift from zero to
positive trade ﬂows  the so-called extensive margin of trade. These new ﬂows correspond to new products shipped
by incumbent exporting countries to a given destination market or by countries exporting for the ﬁrst time to a given
market. Accounting for this margin and using aggregated ﬂows, Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) ﬁnd that belonging
to the WTO makes a diﬀerence for countries that otherwise would never have traded bilaterally.
7Tariﬀ binding is the commitment to not increasing a tariﬀ in the future without accompanying compensation
oﬀered to trade partners. Tariﬀs can be bound at above the currently applied tariﬀ, in which case there is a binding
overhang.
8Cheptea et al. (2014) consider all trade ﬂows except intra-EU trade and mineral, speciﬁc, and non-classiﬁed
products, and show that in 1994 only 4.5% of potential trade ﬂows at the HS 6-digit level were observed, and in
2007 5.9%. Using HS6 export ﬂows for 126 exporting countries to 59 importing countries in 1995, Hummels and
Klenow (2005) ﬁnd that the extensive margin of trade accounts for more than 60% of the increased exports of larger
economies. However, the link between export development and new ﬂows is not systematic, as stressed by Amiti and
Freund (2010) in the Chinese case.
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tariﬀ data are available from 1996 in the Harmonized System (HS) classiﬁcation of traded products,
and for the whole 1996-2006 period. We include 2006 to ensure that we fully observe the impact of
this episode of trade liberalization. Note that negotiations lead to commitments on bound tariﬀs
which might be higher than applied tariﬀs: the actual reductions in tariﬀs may ultimately be smaller
than suggested by the evidence on the Uruguay Round commitments. In our sample, the median
cut in bilateral applied tariﬀs at the product level between 1996 and 2006 lies between -4.6% for
arms and 9.5% for textiles.
We ﬁnd that cuts in applied tariﬀs had an impact on export performances of emerging countries.
The trade creation impact of tariﬀ cuts mainly channeled through the increase in existing ﬂows and
had limited impact on the creation of new ones. A tariﬀ reduction of 1 percentage point from
10% to 9% increases the exports of emerging countries by 2.09% at the intensive margin. The
eﬀect is much lower at the extensive margin (+0.1% for the probability of entry and -0.25% for the
probability of exit). These results  especially at the extensive margin  are partly driven by China
and its increasing trade diversiﬁcation. Our estimations also indicates a stronger positive impact
of tariﬀ cuts at the extensive margin is found for diﬀerentiated goods and at the intensive one for
non-diﬀerentiated products, which corroborates Chaney (2008)'s predictions. Finally, the positive
impact of tariﬀ cuts on the emergence of a new ﬂow in 2006 is linked to the level of initial tariﬀs.
This paper adds to the literature by using highly disaggregated data for a large sample of
countries over a suﬃciently long time span to observe the cumulated impacts of a complete episode
of multilateral trade liberalization and the development of free trade areas (FTAs). Using aggregated
data, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) ﬁnd that two-thirds of the observed trade growth in the period
1958-60 to 1986-88 is due to GDP growth and only a quarter is the result of tariﬀ reductions. The
aggregate evidence is driven partly by new trade ﬂows.
To what extent the aggregate evidence is driven by new trade ﬂows is an important issue, in
particular when it comes to emerging economies engaged in the process of diversifying their exports.
Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) consider bilateral trade at the 5-digit level of the Standard International
Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) of products (i.e. 1,836 products) for country pairs engaged in episodes of
large-scale trade liberalization. Their results show that changes in the extensive margin of trade are
large for many of these episodes. This margin accounts for 9.9% of trade increase between NAFTA
members, and 26.0% of the increase in trade between the United States and Chile, China, and
Korea. Furthermore, the authors highlight that the extensive margin of trade is hardly inﬂuenced
by the business cycle. Using bilateral trade data for 90 countries and 137 partners in 2005 from
the Comtrade database, and tariﬀs from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS)
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database, Flam and Nordström (2007) compute gravity equations to explain the extensive and
intensive margins. They ﬁnd that tariﬀs represent signiﬁcant barriers to trade but due to their
limited cross-section data, they were not able to investigate the impact of time variations in tariﬀs.
Relying on a 7-digit product classiﬁcation, Feenstra and Kee (2007) ﬁnd a positive impact of United
States (US) tariﬀ reductions associated with the NAFTA on the diversiﬁcation of Mexican exports.
They ﬁnd a 20% increase in exported variety due to the NAFTA. But what is speciﬁc to tariﬀ cuts
and what is associated with the indirect eﬀects of economic integration (e.g. transfer of technology,
foreign investments) remains unclear. Hence, a larger set of experiences of trade liberalization is
required. Debaere and Mostashari (2010) rely on the US HS-10 digit classiﬁcation (comprising some
22,000 diﬀerent product categories although only half of these were traded continuously throughout
the period considered), and US HS-8 tariﬀ data. They examine to what extent US tariﬀ reductions
led to increased diversity of imports over the period 1989 to 2000; they ﬁnd a positive but very
limited eﬀect. Finally, the impact of the Uruguay Round on trade margins is investigated in Buono
and Lalanne (2012) using individual ﬁrm data for France. They consider 147 destinations and 57
sectors and observe a positive eﬀect of tariﬀ cuts on the intensive margin but ﬁnd no evidence of
an impact on the extensive margin. Note that since their paper uses ﬁrm data, the margins are
deﬁned diﬀerently.
In contrast to previous work, we rely on detailed trade data at the product level (HS6 digit level)
and tariﬀ information for a large set of importing and exporting countries. We focus on emerging
economies' exports, the most dynamic part of world trade, and consider a time window covering
the most recent episode of multilateral trade liberalization.9 In order not to overstate the role of
tariﬀ cuts, we consider applied (Most Favored Nation - MFN - and preferential) rather than bound
tariﬀs. Cuts to bound tariﬀs may be impressive but often have limited impact on applied tariﬀ due
to binding overhang. Part of the exercise consists of reconstructing a detailed database of applied
tariﬀs for 1996 using the same method as for 2006, taking stock of tariﬀ preferences, tariﬀ quotas
(put in place in the Uruguay round) and speciﬁc tariﬀs. Calculations were made at tariﬀ line level
using the MAcMap method (cf. infra) and aggregated to the HS6 level, which is the classiﬁcation of
trade ﬂows. The mechanism linking liberalization and trade which is what we are interested in, goes
from applied tariﬀs to both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. We however performed a
robustness check by investigating the reaction of both trade margins to changes in the gap between
bound and applied tariﬀs. Results conﬁrm that changes in tariﬀ ceilings have an impact at the
extensive margin of trade as predicted by theory.
9Considering several exporting countries makes it impossible to rely on individual ﬁrm data.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and some descriptive
statistics. Section 3 explains the econometric speciﬁcation and Section 4 discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Sources and sample
The value added of this paper is to address the above discussed issues relying on a large sample of
countries at the most detailed possible product classiﬁcation level. This comes at a cost: it requires
us to use a product classiﬁcation that is common to the whole sample of countries, which cannot be
the country speciﬁc tariﬀ line level. Currently, the most disaggregated level common to all countries
is the HS6 classiﬁcation.
We combine two datasets: trade and tariﬀs at the HS6 level. Regarding trade ﬂows, the BACI
(Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International) database provides exhaustive reconciled trade
ﬂows at the HS6 level since 1995. Export values are free on board and equal to the corresponding
import values. The reconciliation method follows Gaulier and Zignago (2010).
Currently, the main source of information on tariﬀs for analytical studies is WITS (World
Integrated Trade Solution), the World Bank statistics portal. WITS comprises data from the WTO
Integrated Data Base (IDB) and WTO Consolidated Tariﬀ Schedules (CTS), and from TRAINS
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information
System). TRAINS relies on the United Nations Tariﬀ and Market Access Database (TARMAC)
developed by UNCTAD and UNCTAD-WTO International Trade Centre (ITC). The second source
of information is MAcMap (ITC), which relies on TARMAC, IDB and CTS.10 MAcMap provides
consistent treatment of trade preferences and computation of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of
speciﬁc tariﬀs (Bouët et al., 2008).11 We combine these sources of information to obtain a detailed
database relying on a common methodology, as described in Figure 1.
The construction of our dataset, applying the MAcMap assumptions, is part of the value added
of our paper (see Appendix for a detailed description). Firstly, where available, we rely on tariﬀ
10See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm for BACI. MAcMap is disseminated on-line on the ITC
website (www.intracen.org). The HS6 version commonly used in the literature is on the CEPII (Centre d'Etudes
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales) website. Its last version is documented in Guimbard et al. (2012).
11The beta version of MAcMap was published in 2001 (Bouët et al., 2001).
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Figure 1: Combination of data sources on tariﬀs
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Source: Authors' construction
line instead of HS6 information for the computation of AVEs of non-ad valorem tariﬀs and for the
treatment of tariﬀ quotas. This ensures greater accuracy of unit value treatment because we reduce
the usual aggregation bias (two tariﬀ lines with very diﬀerent unit values averaged within an HS6
position). Tariﬀs at the HS6 level are computed as a simple average of the tariﬀs in the tariﬀ lines of
every country (in order to neutralize the impact of diﬀerences in the structure of schedules beyond
the 6-digit level).
Our empirical analysis focuses on the bilateral exports of emerging countries to their main
partners. As yet there is no consensus on either the deﬁnition of emerging economies or the list of
countries included in that group. Therefore we rely on the classiﬁcations provided by six institutions
(International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, CEPII, Morgan Stanley Capital International, London
Stock Exchange and the G20 group) and consider a country is an emerging country if it is classiﬁed
as such by at least three of these six institutions. The Boao Forum for Asia in its 2009 annual
report provides a list of countries deﬁned as "emerging" by each of these institutions (Boao, 2010).
Our sample includes 18 emerging exporting countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa,
South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey.
In relation to importing countries, our sample includes all main partners of the emerging coun-
tries, and covers around 75% of world exports of emerging countries both in 1996 and 2006. We
consider the following 25 importing countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
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EU15, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, USA, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
To combine tariﬀ and trade data successfully, we have to make few choices/assumptions. In
diﬀerent years, and for diﬀerent importing countries, tariﬀ data are expressed in diﬀerent versions
of the HS classiﬁcation. We used conversion tables to convert all the series into HS 1992. Where
more than one tariﬀ position was available for a given year, HS6 product, and importing and
exporting countries, we took the average. Our ﬁnal sample includes 4,870 HS6 products present in
1996 and 2006.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 provides export values and number of product-destination categories exported by each
emerging country to the set of importing partners and for the products included in our sample.
Comparison of 1996 and 2006 observations indicates a net increase on both dimensions (ﬂows and
values) for each emerging exporting country. Thus, we need to disentangle the impact of tariﬀ cuts
on the two dimensions of trade expansion.
Figure 2: Export value and product-destination ﬂows
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Note: Each observation is an emerging exporting country. 'Number Export Flows' is the number of
product-destination categories exported by an emerging country. (Max. number of products: 4870; Max. number of
destinations: 24 or 25 depending whether the emerging country is also included as importer in our sample). 'Export
Value' is the value that an emerging country exports to the (24 or 25) importing countries included in our sample.
Source: Authors' calculation, MAcMaps & BACI
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Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the applied tariﬀ cuts during the period of trade liberalization
associated with implementation of the Uruguay Round. Not all these cuts are associated with the
Round however: certain countries (e.g. India) would likely have cut their tariﬀ unilaterally over that
period. Figure 3 reports the simple average tariﬀs computed for the 4,870 HS products included
in our sample and applied by each importing country to its imports from emerging partners in
1996 and 2006. For all countries (except Japan where we observe a slight increase mainly related to
speciﬁc tariﬀs), we observe a signiﬁcant decrease in the average tariﬀ over the decade considered. As
expected, the average tariﬀs applied by main developed countries (Australia, Canada, EU15, Japan,
Norway, Switzerland and the US) are on average smaller than the ones applied by other importing
countries (4.9% vs. 14.7% in 1996; 3.2% vs. 8.5% in 2006). However, the decrease in these averages
observed between 1996 and 2006, is lower for main developed countries than for other countries.
For main developed countries, the average tariﬀ was low in 1996 and the percentage changes in
protection correspond to trivial absolute changes in the mean. Note that there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences among importing countries in terms of tariﬀ dispersion; in 2006, South Korea, Malaysia,
Norway and Turkey present the highest dispersion rates. Figure 4 describes the share of tariﬀ
peaks, i.e. tariﬀs above 15%. Here, also, we observe signiﬁcant variation across countries, but for
all (except South Africa) the share decreases between 1996 and 2006. However, for seven countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Vietnam) it remains above
25% in 2006.
Figure 3: Average tariﬀs on imports from emerging countries, by importing country (%)
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Figure 4: Share of tariﬀ peaks (i.e. tariﬀs above 15%) on imports from emerging countries, by
importing country (%)
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Did emerging countries beneﬁt from lower tariﬀs and higher tariﬀ cuts between 1996 and 2006,
than other groups of exporting countries? If we consider all importing countries, the emerging
partners face an average tariﬀ of 11.9% in 1996 and 7.0% in 2006, while the median tariﬀs are
7.4% in 1996 and 2.5% in 2006. If we now decompose by groups of importers: In main developed
markets, emerging countries faced an average tariﬀ of 4.9% in 1996, while other developing and
least developed countries (DCs and LDCs) were faced with slightly lower average tariﬀs (4.5% in
1996) due to tariﬀ reductions and exemptions granted as part of the development policy. Developed
countries faced higher tariﬀs (5.6% in 1996). All groups of exporters experienced tariﬀ cuts between
1996 and 2006, but emerging countries faced the smallest reduction (1.7 percentage points), while
the cuts for other DCs and LDCs are equal to 2 percentage points, and to 1.8 percentage points
for developed countries. In other markets included in our sample, the diﬀerences in average tariﬀs
and cuts over the 1996-2006 period between groups of countries are again rather small. In 1996
(resp. 2006), average tariﬀs are 14.5% (8.2%) for imports from developed countries, 14.7% (8.5%)
for imports from emerging countries and 14.7% (9.3%) for those from DCs and LDCs.
We next turn to trade ﬂows and investigate the variation in exports from emerging countries
between 1996 and 2006. We examine both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. Table 1
and Table 2 provide aggregated results respectively for the extensive and intensive margins of trade;
Table 3 breaks these results down by exporting countries.
The results show an increase in trade at both the extensive and intensive margins. We observe
ﬁrst the diversiﬁcation of emerging countries' exports at the product and product-country levels
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(Table 1). The average number of HS products exported by emerging countries between 1996 and
2006 increased by 7.3%. This growth is more impressive if we focus on the product-destination di-
mension. While the number of positive ﬂows still represents less than 24% of total potential ﬂows,
this share increased signiﬁcantly by 39.6% between 1996 and 2006. All in all, these results mean
that emerging countries sent existing export products to many more destinations, suggesting that
trade costs reduced over the period considered. Second, emerging countries experienced a strong
increase in trade at the intensive margin. Table 2 highlights how world exports from emerging coun-
tries multiplied more than three-fold between 1996 and 2006. Furthermore, the share of emerging
countries exports in imports of countries included in our sample increased by around 10 percentage
points between 1996 and 2006. Interestingly, most of the expansion in emerging countries' exports
took place with other emerging countries. At the extensive margin of trade, the increase in the
number of positive ﬂows between 1996 and 2006 reached 51.1% if we focus only on exports to other
emerging countries (versus 39.6% if we consider all importing countries included in our sample). At
the intensive margin also, emerging exports were reoriented slightly toward other emerging markets
over the period. In our sample, the share of emerging exports sent to emerging partners rose from
23.5% in 1996 to 27% in 2006.
Table 1: Extensive margin of emerging countries exports
Potential
number Eﬀective number
1996 2006 Variation (%)
Product dimension
Total number of HS6 products 4,870 4,870 4,869 -0.02
Average number of HS6 products 4,870 3,578.6 3,840.9 7.33
Product-destination dimension
Total number of product-destination
categories (non-zero trade) 2,133,060 366,501 511,774 39.6
Notes: For the 4,870 products, 18 emerging exporting countries and 25 importing countries included
in our sample.
Table 2: Intensive margin of emerging countries exports
1996 2006
Bilateral trade (millions USD) 711,173.6 2,243,432.2
Share that this bilateral trade represents:
In world exports of emerging countries (%) 75.3 74.0
In world imports of importing countries (%) 23.8 33.3
Notes: For the 4,870 products, 18 emerging exporting countries and 25 importing countries included
in our sample. 2006 sample is restricted to trade relationships that were present in 1996.
All emerging countries experienced some diversiﬁcation at the extensive margin and an increase
in their exports at the intensive margin between 1996 and 2006. Table 3 reports the contribution of
each margin to the 1996-2006 export growth of emerging countries. Large growth rates of exports
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are registered, from 89.8% for Argentina to 462.9% for China. However, Table 3 suggests that
tariﬀ cuts between 1996 and 2006 led ﬁrstly to an increase in the value of existing export ﬂows of
emerging economies. By contrast, the creation of new ﬂows (newly exported product to a given
destination) was rather modest. The contribution of the ﬁrst margin to the overall growth of
emerging countries exports over the period is above 74% for all countries in our sample (except for
Egypt). The contribution of the extensive margin is much smaller. Regarding the extensive margin
of entry (new trade ﬂows observed in 2006 which were not present in 1996), the contribution lies
between 3.7% for China (which is already well diversiﬁed in the export market) and 62.2% for
Egypt. Besides, the contribution of the extensive margin of exit (trade ﬂows present in 1996 but
not in 2006) is below 10% for all emerging countries.
Table 3: Decomposition of emerging countries' export growth on the extensive and intensive margins
Countries Change in total Contribution of the Contribution of the Contribution of
exports1996/2006 extensive margin of extensive margin of the intensive
(%) entry (%) exit (%) margin (%)
All countries 221.8 8.2 -1.7 93.5
Argentina# 89.8 35.1 -9.5 74.5
Brazil# 164.4 17.0 -3.4 86.4
Chile# 263.9 16.4 -2.4 86.0
China# 462.9 3.7 -0.1 96.5
Colombia 128.7 22.6 -3.3 80.7
Egypt 200.1 62.2 -7.6 45.4
India# 220.5 14.9 -1.6 86.7
Indonesia# 114.0 18.4 -2.2 83.8
Malaysia# 108.0 7.5 -2.3 94.8
Mexico# 168.1 2.8 -2.0 99.2
Pakistan 100.0 29.7 -3.9 74.2
Peru 305.2 24.0 -3.1 79.1
Philippines# 122.7 15.6 -2.9 87.4
Russia 230.8 5.7 -3.4 97.8
South Africa# 164.0 17.1 -9.0 92.0
South Korea# 177.3 4.9 -1.5 96.6
Thailand 128.0 16.6 -2.1 85.5
Turkey# 252.2 13.3 -2.3 89.0
Notes: For the 4,870 products, 18 emerging exporting countries and 25 importing countries included in our
sample. # denotes Emerging countries that are both exporters and importers in our sample. For the intensive
margin, 2006 sample is restricted to trade relationships that were present in 1996.
To summarize, descriptive statistics highlight a reduction in the average tariﬀs aﬀecting emerg-
ing countries' exports to their main partners accompanied by a growth in these exports (at both
margins). However, these parallel evolutions are not evidence of export development induced by
tariﬀ reductions. Our contribution in this paper therefore, is to investigate whether the observed
trade expansion results from the observed tariﬀ reduction or whether other factors are at play.
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3 Econometric speciﬁcation: Trade eﬀects of tariﬀ cuts
Our aim is to estimate the impact on emerging countries' world trade integration of tariﬀ cuts
granted by their main trading partners between 1996 and 2006. We decompose the eﬀect for each
margin of trade. We analyze whether the new bilateral export relationships set up by emerging
countries in 2006 (extensive margin), and the changes in the value of existing export ﬂows between
1996 and 2006 (intensive margin) come from the tariﬀs cuts granted by their partners over the
period. Estimations are in ﬁrst-diﬀerences and use of bilateral applied tariﬀs.
3.1 Extensive margin of trade
We follow the approach developed by Debaere and Mostashari (2010), which estimates the impact
of tariﬀ reductions between 1989 and 1999 on the range of goods exported to the US in 1999.
Our dependent variable is the probability of having a new bilateral trade ﬂow in 2006 between
countries i and j, i.e. the probability that good k not bilaterally traded in 1996 is exported by the
emerging country i to the partner j in 2006 (Pr(yijk,t = 1|yijk,t−1 = 0)). Note that this is equivalent
to the probability of a switch from 0 to a new existing ﬂow. This choice model can be written in
the latent variable representation, with y∗ijk the latent variable that determines whether or not a
strictly positive trade ﬂow is observed between i and j on good k in 2006. Our main explanatory
variable is the variation in the logarithm of bilateral tariﬀs12 applied by country j on imports of
good k from country i between 1996 and 2006 (∆lnτijk).
Tariﬀ cuts may be endogenous to changes in trade ﬂows. One approach to deal with this
consists in using instrumental-variable techniques. Critical to this approach is the selection of
instruments, which should be correlated with the bilateral tariﬀ cuts but uncorrelated with the
changes in bilateral trade ﬂows. As an alternative to IV estimation, we rely on country-pair ﬁxed
eﬀects to control for the potential endogeneity of tariﬀs, following Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
Since we are looking at ﬁrst-diﬀerences, country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects aim also controlling for long-run
bilateral trade growth shocks (e.g. secular trends in exchange-rates, income, etc.). We also include
HS6 product-importing country ﬁxed eﬀects to capture the demand-side growth shocks to products
which are likely to inﬂuence the tariﬀ cuts.13 Following the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects, our estimated
12Since we consider the power of the tariﬀ (1 + τ), the proportional change in the tariﬀ thus deﬁned is the
proportional change in the duty-paid price in the absence of incomplete pass through. See e.g. Integrated Tariﬀ
Analysis System (ITAS), Australian Productivity Commission, http://www.pc.gov.au/research/economic-models-
frameworks/itas2.
13We have 4,870×25 = 121,750 HS6 product × importing country ﬁxed eﬀects and 6×25×2 + 12×24×2 =876
country-pair-year ﬁxed eﬀects. To keep the number of ﬁxed eﬀects at a reasonable level, we do not interact HS6
product ﬁxed eﬀects and exporting country ﬁxed eﬀects.
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equation is:
Pr (yijk,t|yijk,t−1 = 0) =
1 if y
∗
ijk > 0
0 if y∗ijk ≤ 0
(1)
with y∗ijk = β0 + β1∆lnτijk + FEij + FEjk + ijk
This equation is estimated using a linear probability model. The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in a
probit would give rise to the incidental parameter problem. The linear probability model avoids this
issue. In all regressions, we account for correlation of errors by clustering at country-pair-product
level.
In addition to the probability of entry, one can also study the exit transition. Lower tariﬀs may
indeed reduce exit and thereby maintain more product diversity than the one that would prevail
in the absence of tariﬀ cuts. In that case, our dependent variable is the probability that good k
bilaterally traded in 1996 is no more exported by the emerging country i to the partner j in 2006
(Pr(yijk,t = 0|yijk,t−1 = 1))
3.2 Intensive margin of trade
The eﬀects of tariﬀ cuts on the intensive margin of trade are studying using a similar approach but a
diﬀerent dependent variable. Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Baier and Bergstrand
(2001), our dependent variable (∆ln(Mijk)) is the change in the logarithm of the value of bilateral
exports of good k from country i to country j between 1996 and 2006. We focus on the deepening
of existing trade relations and consider only trade ﬂows that are strictly positive in both 1996 and
2006 (i.e. observations where yijk,t = 1|yijk,t−1 = 1). The explanatory variables are the same as
those in equation (1). The estimated equation is as follows:
∆ln(Mijk) = γ0 + γ1∆lnτijk + FEij + FEjk + ηijk (2)
Equation (2) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the error terms are clustered and
the error terms are clustered at country-pair-product level.
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4 Results
4.1 Cross-section results: Trade eﬀects of tariﬀs
Before studying the trade eﬀects of tariﬀ cuts, we ﬁrst check that tariﬀs are relevant determinants
of emerging countries' exports and that our sample provides results in line with the usual gravity
estimates found in the trade literature. To do so, we simply pool data for 1996 and 2006 and perform
cross-section estimations. Results are reported in Table ST2 of the Appendix. Our estimations
account for the size of the countries (proxied by the population), their productivity and purchasing
power which are likely to inﬂuence the scope and quality of exports (reﬂected in the GDP per capita
in current USD), and their level of development (e.g. their infrastructures, proxied by the GDP per
capita based on PPP expressed in 2005 USD). We also control for bilateral distance  a proxy for
variable transport costs, as well as countries' contiguity and common language.14 Finally, we include
the competition faced by emerging countries on their export markets by computing a Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman index measuring the concentration of country j's imports in year t.15 Columns (1)-(3)
deal with the extensive margin of trade and columns (4)-(6) with the intensive one. Year and HS6
product ﬁxed eﬀects are included in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5), while columns (3) and (6) include
country-pair-year and HS6 product-importing country ﬁxed eﬀects.
Results are similar to those usually found in the gravity literature. Populations of both countries
have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on trade. This positive impact simply translates into a
size eﬀect.16 Current GDPs per capita also impact positively and signiﬁcantly the ﬂows. The
magnitude of the estimates is higher for the exporting country and at the intensive margin of trade.
This result suggests that productivity and exporting countries' comparative advantage towards new
activities certainly play a role. However, GDPs per capita in PPP terms have a stronger impact
than GDPs per capita in current dollars, suggesting that the level of development (for example of
the infrastructures) of emerging countries has a bigger inﬂuence on their probability of exporting
good k than their productivity. Regarding the gravity variables, results are as expected: negative
14GDP per capita and population are taken from the World Development Indicators. Data on distance, contiguity
and common border are from the CEPII database http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
15This index is calculated by squaring the market share of each exporting country j competing on the import
market of good k in country i, and summing the resulting numbers (Hjkt =
∑
s2ijkt with sijkt = (Mijkt/Mjkt) is
the share and M the value of imports). It is bounded between zero and one: the closer to zero, the more diversiﬁed
the import basket. Note that our results on tariﬀs are robust to the exclusion of the Herﬁndahl variable from the
estimations.
16Our estimations include importing country's population and GDP per capita in order to be coherent with the
exporting country's side which uses GDP per capita to measure the productivity or level of development of emerging
countries. The sum of the population and GDP per capita coeﬃcients (which is positive in our estimations) can be
considered the GDP eﬀect.
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impact for distance and positive eﬀect for common border and common language. Interestingly,
the importing country's Herﬁndahl index is always negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the
probability and the value of exports between emerging countries and their main trading partners are
negatively inﬂuenced by the level of concentration of the importing country: the more concentrated
the import market, the lower the probability of exporting and the lower the value of exports. Finally,
the estimated coeﬃcient on tariﬀs is negative and signiﬁcant in all the estimations. Tariﬀs therefore
act as trade barriers and tend to impede exports of emerging countries to their main partners. The
trade-reducing eﬀect of tariﬀs is smaller once their endogeneity is controlled for (columns (3) and
(6)) but remains signiﬁcant. These results highlight that tariﬀs vary across countries and over time
in our sample, suggesting that we can explore the eﬀect of tariﬀs cuts on the exports of emerging
countries between 1996 and 2006. The next tables deal with these questions.
4.2 First-diﬀerences results: Trade eﬀects of tariﬀs cuts
Table 4 shows the impact of tariﬀ changes on emerging countries' exports. In our sample, bilateral
tariﬀs (deﬁned at the product level) may vary into diﬀerent directions. For 48% of our observations,
applied tariﬀs have decreased between 1996 and 2006, while for 6% of our observations we can notice
an increase. For the rest (46% of our observations), tariﬀs remain unchanged between 1996 and
2006. Table 4 studies the diﬀerentiated impact of a tariﬀ variation (positive or negative) on trade
ﬂows. Both margins of trade are investigated and for the extensive one, we distinguish between the
entry and the exit. The ﬁrst three columns include the whole set of exporting emerging countries
included in our sample (18 countries). However among them, China may be an outlier and may
potentially drive our results. China is indeed much more diversiﬁed than other emerging countries.
In 1996, China already exports 4,735 diﬀerent HS6 products and this number is equal to 4,817
in 2006 (over a potential number of 4870 products). This is well above the number of products
exported by other emerging countries. The diﬀerence between China and the rest of emerging
exporters is even larger if we look at the product-destination dimension (non-zero trade): in 1996,
China serves 47.4% of the potential number of product-destination categories and in 2006, this
share reaches 71.9%. Therefore, in the last three columns of Table 4, we exclude China from the
set of exporting countries. Our results conﬁrm our suspicions: some results are driven by China.
The top of Table 4 focuses only on observations for which we observe a decrease of tariﬀs between
1996 and 2006. Tariﬀ cuts reduce the probability for emerging countries to exit the export market
in 2006 and increase the value of their export ﬂows between 1996 and 2006 (intensive margin of
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trade). Regarding the probability of having a new bilateral trade relationship in 2006 (extensive
margin of trade, entry), we observe no eﬀect of tariﬀ cuts when China is included in the set of
exporting emerging countries, but a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect once China is excluded. These
diﬀerences on the probability of entry and exit when China is included/excluded can be justiﬁable as
follows: a tariﬀ reduction does not promote the entry of China in the destination market (because
Chinese exporters are already present) but may aﬀect its probability of exit. According to the
estimated coeﬃcients of the three last columns, our results suggest that a reduction of tariﬀs of 1
percentage point from 10% to 9% increases the extensive margin of entry by 0.1% and the intensive
one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit by 0.25%. Based, on our results, we
can also quantify entries and exits resulting from tariﬀ cuts. For the whole sample (i.e. with China
among exporting countries), 1.2% of the entries observed in 2006 are due to the tariﬀ cuts granted
to emerging countries between 1996 and 2006. Tariﬀ cuts also induce a reduction of exits equal
to 7.1%. Furthermore, new entries and avoided exits represent 3.9% of the ﬂows observed at the
extensive margin in 2006. When China is excluded from the sample of exporting countries, we get
the following percentages: 8.8% of the entries observed in 2006 result from the tariﬀ cuts and thanks
to these cuts, exits have been reduced by 8%. These entries and avoided exits represent 12.3% of
the extensive ﬂows in 2006. At the intensive margin, emerging exports (in logs) grew by 21.2%
between 1996 and 2006. Without tariﬀ cuts, this growth would have reached 3.3% only. Without
China among exporting countries, the percentages are respectively 16.3% and 4.3%. To sum up,
between 1996 and 2006, emerging exports (in logs) grew by 52.2% (+21.2% at the intensive margin
of trade; +204% at the extensive one). In the absence of tariﬀ cuts, the growth would have been
only 35.3% (+3.3% at the intensive margin; +192.1% at the extensive one).
We then examine the impact of tariﬀ cuts on the extensive and intensive margins of trade
controlling for the fact that some tariﬀs have not changed between 1996 and 2006. To do so, we
include the observations for which tariﬀs have not changed between 1996 and 2006 in our sample.
Previous conclusions remain unchanged and the only slight observable diﬀerence is the positive and
signiﬁcant impact of tariﬀ cuts on the probability of entry even when China is taken into account in
our sample of exporting countries. These results suggest some interpretations. Overall, other things
being equal, there is an evidence of a tariﬀ reduction conducive to a broader range of exported goods
and a larger value of exports from emerging countries in 2006.
The last two parts of Table 4 explore the eﬀect of a tariﬀ increase between 1996 and 2006 on
emerging exports. Remember that we use bilateral applied tariﬀs. Tariﬀs may therefore increase
following a rise of the applied tariﬀs by the importing country (which is allowed by the WTO if
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the applied tariﬀ remains below or equal the bound tariﬀ) or following some variations in the unit
value, which may generate some changes in the computation of the HS6 tariﬀ. If we restrict our
sample to observations with a strictly positive increase in tariﬀs, we only observe an impact on
the exit margin: a tariﬀ increase tends to raise the probability of exit. If the sample is expanded
to observations for which tariﬀs have not changed between 1996 and 2006, an increase in tariﬀs
augments the probability of exit of emerging exporters from the destination market and has also a
negative impact on the intensive margin.
Table 4: Impact of tariﬀ variations on emerging countries' exports
Dependent variable EM EM IM EM EM IM
entry exit entry exit
Sample With China as exporter Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs < 0
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.016 0.216a -1.765a -0.114a 0.274a -2.287a
(0.027) (0.057) (0.408) (0.027) (0.062) (0.443)
Observations 838,573 184,024 141,388 812,670 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.352 0.546 0.503 0.329 0.567 0.490
Observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs ≤ 0
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.062a 0.206a -1.534a -0.122a 0.263a -2.308a
(0.016) (0.037) (0.262) (0.016) (0.042) (0.292)
Observations 1,658,352 343,671 263,702 1,600,697 292,264 214,912
R-squared 0.311 0.497 0.446 0.283 0.520 0.429
Observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs > 0
∆ ln tariﬀs 0.044 0.392c 1.809 0.033 0.676b 1.861
(0.053) (0.234) (1.527) (0.054) (0.281) (1.919)
Observations 107,397 22,729 17,407 103,646 18,713 13,636
R-squared 0.381 0.581 0.590 0.357 0.614 0.595
Observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs ≥ 0
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.017 0.284b -1.844b -0.029 0.285b -2.402a
(0.038) (0.122) (0.746) (0.039) (0.139) (0.849)
Observations 927,176 182,376 139,721 891,673 151,068 110,191
R-squared 0.319 0.514 0.466 0.290 0.540 0.451
Notes: EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive margin of trade. Robust standard errors clustered by
country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all
estimations (not reported). Columns (1)-(3): China is included in the set of exporting countries. Columns (4)-(6):
China is excluded from this set. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
As our main research interest lies in tariﬀ cuts granted to emerging countries, our sample in
the subsequent estimations is restricted to observations for which a decrease in tariﬀs is registered
between 1996 and 2006. Figure 5 shows that there are some signiﬁcant variation in tariﬀ cuts
between 1996 and 2006. For each HS chapter, Figure 5 displays the box plot of bilateral tariﬀ cuts
at the product level. The median cut lies between -4.61% for arms and -9.53% for textiles. In
addition to textiles, footwear, animal & animal products and foodstuﬀs are the sectors with the
biggest median cut. As previously shown, our results are not driven by the observations for which
tariﬀs remain stable between 1996 and 2006; we therefore exclude them from our sample.
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Figure 5: 1996-2006 cuts in bilateral tariﬀs, by HS chapter (%)
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Table 5 studies the impact of tariﬀs cuts on the emerging countries' exports for diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations and subsamples. We distinguish between the extensive margin (entry in columns (1) and (4);
exit in columns (2) and (5)) and the intensive one (columns (3) and (6)). The ﬁrst three columns
include China in the set of exporting countries, while it is excluded in the last three columns. These
estimations can be seen as robustness checks of our baseline results (top of Table 4). For ease of
comparison, we report the latter at the top of Table 5.
We investigate ﬁrst whether our results are robust to the use of an alternative deﬁnition of tariﬀs.
In relation to market access, what is important is not the separate changes in the market access of
individual exporters, but the combined outcome of changes in the market access of all competing
actors. Thus, instead of accounting only for absolute variations in bilateral tariﬀs, we take account
also of the variations in the tariﬀs faced by all competitors in the same importing market for a given
product in order to explain changes in preference margins, if any. We deﬁne a new explanatory
variable which captures the relative variation in tariﬀs faced by each exporting country i for a
product k on market j. This deﬁnition follows Fugazza and Nicita (2013) and is calculated as the
diﬀerence in the variations in tariﬀs between 1996 and 2006 faced by exporting country i for product
k on market j, and the variations in tariﬀs over 1996-2006 faced by all other foreign competitors in
the same import market and for the same good
(
∆rellnτijk = ∆lnτijk −
∑
w 6=i ∆lnτwjk
)
. The tariﬀ
faced by other foreign competitors is computed as the trade weighted average of the tariﬀs imposed
by country i on all export partners of product k. The estimations validate our baseline results.
The second check deals with zero ﬂows. Among missing bilateral trade ﬂows (i.e. zero trade
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ﬂows), we can distinguish between true zeros (i.e. products that are never exported by a country,
e.g., because of lack of endowments to produce such goods) and non-true zeros (i.e. products that
are not traded with some but not all partners). Including all zeros could aﬀect our estimates at the
extensive margin (entry).17 Therefore, for 1996 we identify those products that are never exported
by a given emerging country and exclude them from the sample. The results are unaﬀected by this
reduced sample.
The third robustness check follows Besede² and Prusa (2011) and refers only to continuous
export ﬂows. As Besede² and Prusa indicate, point-to-point comparisons (1996 vs. 2006 in our
case) could be biased if relationships are short-lived. The bias may speciﬁcally aﬀect the extensive
margin. We rerun the estimations dropping all non-continuous export ﬂows, i.e. ﬂows that appear,
disappear and then reappear continuously over the 1996-2006 period. The estimated coeﬃcients
and level of signiﬁcance remain unchanged.
Our results for both the extensive and intensive margins may be driven by the limited number
of products. As additional checks, we repeat the estimations dropping i) agricultural products
(HS01-24), ii) mineral products (HS25-27), and iii) the speciﬁc sector of arms (HS93). The baseline
results remain valid for both margins of trade.
Rather than being driven by particular products, our results may be driven by some countries
(and we already mentioned the case of China). Our ﬁnal robustness check deals with this potential
issue by dropping all importing and exporting countries not members of the WTO in 1996 and/or
2006 (i.e. China, Russia, and Vietnam). Again, our results are not aﬀected by these exclusions.
Table 6 compares emerging countries with other developing countries. It reproduces our baseline
estimation (with HS6 product-importing country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects) for countries which
are usually classiﬁed as developing or among the least developed ones and which are not included
in our group of emerging exporters. For comparison, we reproduce the results of the estimations
previously obtained for emerging exporting countries.
Estimated coeﬃcients on developing exporters are slightly smaller than the ones on emerging
countries once China is excluded from the set of exporters. However, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
only at the extensive margin of entry. This similarity in results is rather surprising since developing
countries, and especially least developed ones, beneﬁted from high tariﬀ reductions granted by
main importing countries on account of the development policy. Two main explanations could be
provided: ﬁrst, tariﬀ cuts granted to developing countries are not always targeted towards products
for which these countries are competitive. Second, non-tariﬀ measures may be substitute tariﬀ
17The intensive margin, which focuses only on strictly positive ﬂows, is of course not aﬀected.
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Table 5: Impact of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports: Alternative speciﬁcations and samples
Dependent variable EM EM IM EM EM IM
entry exit entry exit
Sample With China as exporter Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.016 0.216a -1.765a -0.114a 0.274a -2.287a
(0.027) (0.057) (0.408) (0.027) (0.062) (0.443)
Observations 838,573 184,024 141,388 812,670 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.352 0.546 0.503 0.329 0.567 0.490
With relative variation in tariﬀs
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.037 0.413a -2.016a -0.209a 0.550a -3.528a
(0.029) (0.048) (0.346) (0.029) (0.054) (0.390)
Observations 838,573 184,024 141,388 812,670 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.352 0.546 0.503 0.329 0.567 0.491
Without true zeros
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.021 0.216a -1.765a -0.112a 0.274a -2.287a
(0.034) (0.057) (0.408) (0.034) (0.062) (0.443)
Observations 626,863 184,024 141,388 604,182 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.373 0.546 0.503 0.350 0.567 0.490
Without non-continuous ﬂows
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.003 0.221a -1.583a -0.080a 0.278a -2.436a
(0.023) (0.060) (0.517) (0.023) (0.068) (0.579)
Observations 777,356 107,279 91,314 759,056 89,579 73,924
R-squared 0.277 0.715 0.584 0.260 0.747 0.575
Only manufacturing
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.049 0.254a -2.553a -0.106a 0.313a -3.191a
(0.032) (0.061) (0.443) (0.032) (0.067) (0.484)
Observations 717,321 166,863 129,098 696,536 144,628 107,638
R-squared 0.370 0.551 0.508 0.341 0.572 0.493
Without mineral products
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.015 0.219a -1.761a -0.111a 0.279a -2.280a
(0.027) (0.057) (0.408) (0.028) (0.063) (0.442)
Observations 821,159 182,386 140,272 795,904 158,463 117,407
R-squared 0.353 0.545 0.502 0.330 0.566 0.489
Without arms
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.012 0.217a -1.761a -0.110a 0.274a -2.284a
(0.027) (0.057) (0.408) (0.027) (0.062) (0.443)
Observations 835,740 183,713 141,205 809,942 159,648 118,210
R-squared 0.353 0.546 0.503 0.329 0.566 0.490
Without non-WTO members
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.110a 0.225a -2.626a -0.110a 0.225a -2.626a
(0.029) (0.066) (0.466) (0.029) (0.066) (0.466)
Observations 693,533 138,018 102,425 693,533 138,018 102,425
R-squared 0.328 0.577 0.496 0.328 0.577 0.496
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive margin of trade.
Robust standard errors clustered by country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing
country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations (not reported). Columns (1)-(3): China is included in
the set of exporting countries. Columns (4)-(6): China is excluded from this set.a p<0.01.
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protection (see Limão and Tovar (2011), for some evidence of this substitution) and may aﬀect
more drastically developing exporters than emerging ones.
Table 6: Impact of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports: Comparison with developing countries
Dependent variable EM EM IM
entry exit
Model (1) (2) (3)
Emerging exporters (with China)
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.016 0.216a -1.765a
(0.027) (0.057) (0.408)
Observations 838,573 184,024 141,388
R-squared 0.352 0.546 0.503
Emerging exporters (without China)
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.114a 0.274a -2.287a
(0.027) (0.062) (0.443)
Observations 812,670 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.329 0.567 0.490
Others developing exporters
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.062a 0.231a -1.867a
(0.004) (0.060) (0.461)
Observations 7,028,173 122,875 79,608
R-squared 0.185 0.615 0.539
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. EM: Extensive margin of trade.
IM: Intensive margin of trade. Robust standard errors clustered by country
pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing country and
ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations (not reported). a p<0.01.
Table 7 goes deeper in the analysis by studying whether the observed trade eﬀects are related to
the size of the tariﬀ cuts. To do so, we discretize the change in tariﬀs into two bins: below and above
the median cut (median cut is equal to 5.93%). As previously, Table 7 distinguishes between the
extensive (entry and exit) and intensive margins; China is included in the set of exporting countries
in the ﬁrst three columns, but excluded in the last three columns.
Interestingly, results diﬀer across trade margins. High tariﬀ cuts impact the extensive margin
of exit and the intensive margin, while small cuts have almost no impact on these two margins. By
contrast, the extensive margin of entry is more impacted by small than by big tariﬀ cuts. These
results can be interpreted as follows: following a small reduction in tariﬀs, new emerging exporters
are able to enter the export market. On the other hand, established exporters are not sensitive to
small cuts and only big tariﬀ cuts may impact their probability of exit or their intensive margin.
Note that on average, products with below the median tariﬀ cuts are also the ones with relatively
small initial tariﬀs. Thus, high cuts on these products are less likely to happen; however, these
products are not necessarily trivial in emerging exporters' basket.
Table 8 investigates the impact of tariﬀ cuts for diﬀerent groups of products. We refer to the
classiﬁcation developed by Rauch (1999) and distinguish between diﬀerentiated goods and other
goods. The latter include organized exchange and reference priced goods. Some products do not
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Table 7: Impact of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports: Small vs. big cuts
Dependent variable EM EM IM EM EM IM
entry exit entry exit
Sample With China as exporter Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln tariﬀs above the median -0.057c 0.225a -1.593a -0.133a 0.266a -2.108a
(0.029) (0.061) (0.443) (0.030) (0.067) (0.477)
∆ ln tariﬀs below the median -0.308a 0.276c -0.584 -0.253a 0.216 -1.008
(0.076) (0.162) (1.146) (0.076) (0.180) (1.271)
Observations 838,573 184,024 141,388 812,670 159,909 118,357
R-squared 0.352 0.546 0.503 0.329 0.567 0.490
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive margin of trade.
Robust standard errors clustered by country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing
country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations (not reported). Columns (1)-(3): China is included in
the set of exporting countries. Columns (4)-(6): China is excluded from this set. a p<0.01, c p<0.1.
appear in Rauch's classiﬁcation which explains the slightly smaller number of observations. Also,
Rauch (1999) provides two classiﬁcations: a conservative and a liberal one. The conservative
classiﬁcation minimizes the number of non-diﬀerentiated products, while the liberal one maximizes
it. Table 8 reports the results using the liberal classiﬁcation. Finally, diﬀerentiation is more an issue
for manufacturing goods than agricultural ones. We therefore restrict our analysis to manufacturing
products here.
Results diﬀer across trade margins. At the extensive margin (entry and exit), diﬀerentiated
goods are more signiﬁcantly impacted by tariﬀ cuts than non-diﬀerentiated ones, while the opposite
result is observed at the intensive margin. These results are in line with Chaney (2008), who
highlights that the extensive and intensive margins of trade are diﬀerently aﬀected by the elasticity
of substitution. More precisely, Chaney (2008) shows that a higher elasticity of substitution makes
the extensive margin of trade is less sensitive to changes in trade barriers and the intensive margin
more sensitive (and vice versa if the elasticity of substitution is low). Diﬀerentiated goods have the
highest level of diﬀerentiation and therefore the lowest elasticity of substitution. Thus, our results
conﬁrm Chaney's predictions.
Table 9 examines the impact of tariﬀ cuts, controlling for the initial and ﬁnal level of tariﬀs faced
by emerging exporting countries in 1996 and 2006. To limit the number of estimations and keep the
table readable, we just consider one set of exporting countries (i.e. the one without China). The
ﬁrst part of Table 9 controls for 1996 tariﬀs. As previously, we distinguish between the extensive
margins of entry and exit and the intensive one. In each case, the ﬁrst regression focuses on the
unconditional eﬀect of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports. The second regression conditions
the impact of tariﬀ cuts on the initial level of tariﬀs by introducing an interaction term between the
two variables. The second part of Table 9 reports the same estimations but using the 2006 tariﬀs.
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Table 8: Impact of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports: Sector analysis
Dependent variable EM EM IM EM EM IM
entry exit entry exit
Sample With China as exporter Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln tariﬀs: diﬀerentiated goods -0.043 0.247a -2.354a -0.262a 0.306a -2.924a
(0.033) (0.064) (0.461) (0.055) (0.070) (0.503)
∆ ln tariﬀs: other goods -0.101c 0.248c -4.158a -0.083b 0.335b -5.283a
(0.054) (0.127) (0.924) (0.032) (0.140) (1.009)
Observations 684,849 158,756 122,535 665,147 137,417 101,944
R-squared 0.370 0.552 0.510 0.340 0.574 0.495
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive margin of trade.
Robust standard errors clustered by country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing
country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations (not reported). Columns (1)-(3): China is included in
the set of exporting countries. Columns (4)-(6): China is excluded from this set. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
The following main outcomes are observed: First, initial and ﬁnal tariﬀs have no impact on the
extensive margins, but a negative and signiﬁcant one on the intensive margin. Second, we show that
the positive impact of tariﬀ cuts on the probability of having a new bilateral trade ﬂow in 2006 grows
with the initial tariﬀs. This result suggests that the positive impact of tariﬀ cuts on the emergence
of a new ﬂow in 2006 is not unconditional, but is rather proportional to the level of initial tariﬀs.
This result does not hold for the extensive margin of exit and for the intensive margin. Finally, our
results indicate that the positive impact of tariﬀs cuts on the variations in export performances of
emerging countries between 1996 and 2006 is never related to the level of tariﬀs in 2006. The last
ﬁnding is rather reassuring since the level of ﬁnal tariﬀs is not necessarily known before 2006 by
emerging countries and therefore should not determine their export performances.
Finally, Table 10 oﬀers a last robustness check by investigating the reaction of both trade margins
to changes in tariﬀ ceilings.18 Tariﬀ ceilings represent the gap between bound and applied tariﬀs.
As theoretically shown by Francois and Martin (2004) and Sala et al. (2010), the extensive margin of
trade is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by changes in ceilings, while these changes do not impact the intensive
one (which in contrast responds to changes in applied tariﬀs). To test this theoretical conjecture
on our sample, we ﬁrst re-built bound tariﬀs for 1996 and 2006 at the tariﬀ line level. Countries'
commitments at the WTO were used and we assumed a linear phasing out for tariﬀs. Data at the
tariﬀ line were then averaged at the HS6 level and changes in tariﬀ ceilings were computed using
the 1996 and 2006 applied tariﬀs. Results suggest that changes in tariﬀ ceilings have an impact
at the extensive margin of trade (both on entry and exit), while the eﬀect at the intensive one is
not signiﬁcant. These results therefore validate the theoretical result highlighted by Francois and
Martin (2004) and Sala et al. (2010).
18We thank one of the referees for this suggestion.
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Table 9: Impact of tariﬀ cuts on emerging countries' exports: Interactions with initial and ﬁnal
tariﬀs
Dependent variable EM EM EM EM IM IM
entry entry exit exit
Sample Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction with initial tariﬀs
Ln 1996 tariﬀs -0.112 -0.135 -0.112 -0.117 -3.418b -3.346b
(0.120) (0.121) (0.206) (0.206) (1.402) (1.406)
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.117a -0.028 0.272a 0.286a -2.369a -2.628a
(0.027) (0.045) (0.062) (0.081) (0.444) (0.525)
∆ ln tariﬀs X Ln 1996 tariﬀs -0.262b -0.053 0.907
(0.115) (0.197) (0.879)
Observations 812,670 812,670 159,909 159,909 118,357 118,357
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.567 0.567 0.490 0.490
Interaction with ﬁnal tariﬀs
Ln 2006 tariﬀs -0.112 -0.090 -0.112 -0.113 -3.418b -3.348b
(0.120) (0.123) (0.206) (0.207) (1.402) (1.403)
∆ ln tariﬀs -0.005 -0.012 0.384c 0.385c 1.049 0.994
(0.120) (0.120) (0.213) (0.213) (1.442) (1.444)
∆ ln tariﬀs X Ln 2006 tariﬀs 0.157 -0.021 1.751
(0.169) (0.382) (1.516)
Observations 812,670 812,670 159,909 159,909 118,357 118,357
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.567 0.567 0.490 0.490
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. China is excluded from the set of exporting countries.
EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive margin of trade. Robust standard errors clustered by
country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. HS6 product X importing country and country-pair ﬁxed
eﬀects in all estimations (not reported). a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table 10: Impact of changes in tariﬀ ceilings on emerging countries' exports
Dependent variable EM EM IM EM EM IM
entry exit entry exit
Sample With China as exporter Without China as exporter
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln tariﬀ ceilings -0.133a 0.216b 0.437 -0.102a 0.309a 1.229
(0.035) (0.100) (0.691) (0.035) (0.114) (0.779)
Observations 590,921 136,057 104,711 573,129 113,280 82,992
R-squared 0.312 0.502 0.457 0.285 0.528 0.433
Notes: Only observations with ∆ ln tariﬀs <0. EM: Extensive margin of trade. IM: Intensive
margin of trade. Robust standard errors clustered by country pair-HS6 product in parentheses.
HS6 product X importing country and country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects in all estimations (not reported).
Columns (1)-(3): China is included in the set of exporting countries. Columns (4)-(6): China
is excluded from this set. a p<0.01, b p<0.05.
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5 Conclusion
This article analyzed the impact of tariﬀ reductions granted to emerging countries by their main
trading partners between 1996 and 2006, on bilateral trade ﬂows. Our results suggest ﬁrst that
though relatively modest, tariﬀ cuts had a non trivial impact on export performances of emerging
countries. We found a positive eﬀect of tariﬀ cuts at both the extensive (increase in entry and
reduction in exit) and intensive trade margins. Our main estimates indicate that a reduction of
tariﬀs of 1 percentage point from 10% to 9% increases the extensive margin of entry by 0.1% and
the intensive one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit by 0.25%. Second, sector
level analysis based on Rauch (1999)'s classiﬁcation, highlights a stronger positive impact of tariﬀ
cuts at the extensive margin for diﬀerentiated goods and at the intensive one for non-diﬀerentiated
products. These results validate Chaney (2008)'s predictions. Our ﬁndings, which are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations and samples, also suggest that higher tariﬀ cuts impact more the extensive
margin of exit and the intensive margin, while smaller cuts have more eﬀect at the extensive margin
of entry. Finally, we show that the positive impact of tariﬀ cuts on the emergence of a new ﬂow in
2006 is not unconditional, but is proportional to the level of initial tariﬀs.
Limited cuts may have been oﬀered by importing countries on products for which emerging
countries are competitive. Similarly, tariﬀ peaks may have been maintained in labor intensive
products. Without these defensive strategies, one could have expected an even higher eﬀect of tariﬀ
cuts on emerging exports. Besides, non-tariﬀ measures may replace tariﬀs. Recurrent tariﬀ cuts and
generalized binding would mean that the positive extensive margin of trade associated with trade
liberalization would depend increasingly on agreements related to non-tariﬀ measures. Shepherd
(2007) provides partial evidence of this by relying on harmonization of standards, and using a
database of EU product standards in the textiles, garments, and footwear industries. However,
this line of investigation is beyond the scope of the present paper and would require reliable and
exhaustive databases on non-tariﬀ measures.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Details on the construction of the 1996 tariﬀ dataset
Since MAcMap is not available for 1996, we rely on TRAINS source ﬁles and apply the MAcMap
assumptions and methodology to this source data for our initial period. If a country is missing in
TRAINS, we use IDB instead. We rely on national tariﬀ schedules at tariﬀ line level in order to
better measure the unit values of trade ﬂows, before averaging at the HS6 level. In principle, median
unit values are computed for each importing country and product. When the distribution of unit
values does not allow such an approach we adopt a tiered approach by partitioning the distribution
and averaging the center unit values in each tier. When too few observations are available (less
than 10 for an importing country and a tariﬀ line) this algorithm cannot be used and we use the
HS6 unit value instead. It is computed as the unit value of the reference group to which the country
belongs. Reference groups are constructed using Principal Component Analysis.
The richness of the tariﬀ line is worth considering for computation of AVEs of non-ad valorem
tariﬀs and for the treatment of tariﬀ quotas. Non-ad valorem tariﬀs are comprised of speciﬁc duties,
compound duties, mixed duties and technical duties, all deﬁned at tariﬀ line level. They are imposed
by 68 out of the 151 countries covered in MAcMap. The method used here is mostly similar to
that applied in the WTO World Trade Proﬁle (http://stat.wto.org/), with some slight diﬀerences.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that when computing the AVEs of speciﬁc tariﬀs we rely on 3-year moving
averages of unit values; we also introduce a 1,000% cap (less than 0.01% of the observations).
6.2 Countries included in the sample
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Table ST1: Countries included in the sample
Exporting emerging countries Importing countries
Argentina Argentina
Brazil Australia
Chile Brazil
China Canada
Colombia Chile
Egypt China
India EU15
Indonesia India
Malaysia Indonesia
Mexico Israel
Pakistan Japan
Peru Malaysia
Philippines Mauritius
Russia Mexico
South Africa Norway
South Korea Philippines
Thailand Singapore
Turkey South Africa
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Switzerland
Turkey
United States
Venezuela
Vietnam
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Table ST2: Determinants of emerging countries' exports: Basic gravity
Dependent variable Extensive margin Intensive margin
Probability of exports Value of exports
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln tariﬀs -0.113a -0.105a -0.047a -0.649a -0.579a -0.222a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.034) (0.033) (0.061)
Ln(Populationexporter) 0.122
a 0.122a 0.659a 0.676a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(GDP per capitaexporter) (current $) 0.108
a 0.608a
(0.001) (0.004)
Ln(GDP per capitaexporter) (PPP) 0.139
a 0.830a
(0.001) (0.006)
Ln(Populationexporter) 0.046
a 0.049a 0.377a 0.390a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(GDP per capitaimporter) (current $) 0.049
a 0.367a
(0.001) (0.002)
Ln(GDP per capitaimporter) (PPP) 0.073
a 0.535a
(0.001) (0.003)
Ln distance -0.124a -0.123a -0.574a -0.572a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Common border 0.002c 0.001 0.130a 0.104a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
Common language 0.070a 0.066a 0.117a 0.060a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
Herﬁndahl Indeximporter -0.115
a -0.115a -0.823a -0.819a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
Fixed eﬀects Year Year Year X Year Year Year X
Fixed eﬀects country-pair country-pair
HS6 HS6 HS6 X HS6 HS6 HS6 X
importer importer
Observations 4,085,444 4,085,444 4,265,209 878,097 878,097 878,097
R-squared 0.276 0.273 0.423 0.249 0.250 0.448
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country pair-HS6 product in parentheses. Constant & ﬁxed eﬀects not
reported. a p<0.01, c p<0.1.
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